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Events prior to Free Officers' revolt
July 1952 to February 1955 .

























Wafd born as political party 1919
Egyptian Communist party accepted by COMINTERN 1922
I
Communists call for land reform and nationalization of the
Canal 1925
Muslim Brotherhood founded 1928
Brotherhood calls for Pan-Islam, branch of movement opened
in Syria 1937
Egyptian Prime Minister (Ali Maher) adopts pro (pan) -Arab
policy to demonstrate Egyptian freedom from British
control 1 r/i\.<i
British force King to appoint pro-British Prima Minlftiw f«b \'thv.
Nasser collaborates with Brotherhood ] '/i'i
Wafd dismissed, Palace rules Oct 19*14
Prime Minister assassinated after declaring war on Axis Feb 19^5
League of Arab States founded Mar l Qk5
Brethren establish own companies with workers sharing in
the profits 19*4-5
Brethren call for abolition of Treaty of 1936, removal of
all British, refusal to negotiate, and elimination of
all political parties 19*4-6
Brethren advocate land reform 10*1-7
Aswan High Dam project advanced Jan 19*4-8
Palestine campaign May 19*4-8
Brotherhood abolished (first time) Dec 19*4-8
General Guide (Al Banna) assassinated Feb 19*4-9
Wafd returns to power Jan 1
Martial law lifted May 1951






Agrarian (land) Reform Law announced
Political parties dissolved (Brethren not included)
Liberation Rally formed
Canal negotiations start
Monarch abolished and Egypt declared Republic
Communist party arrests start
National Guard created














Nasser makes peace with General Guide and Brotherhood
legalized. Communists and Brotherhood split,
Nasser's counter-coup
Nasser makes Pilgrimage
New Canal Treaty signed
Nasser assassination attempt
Brotherhood trials completed
Iraq and Turkey sign Baghdad Pact
"The" Gaza raid
Bandung Conference
Russia, asked to supply arms
Work on Aswan Dam commences
Sudan pro-Egyptian revolt subdued



















Egypt zes Red China ' May I956
Last L:.. 1 soldier leaves Canal 18 Jun 1956
Nasser elected President 23 Jun 1956
United States refuses Dam aid 19 Jul 1956
Nasser nationalizes Canal 26 Jul 1956

The Suez Crisis of 195& is generally considered a pivotal event "by-
most observers of the international scene. The significance of the occa-
sion appears to he that it brought an era to an end. The Crisis marked
i
the real end of the world power structure that had prevailed during World
War II, and promised that there were new voices to be heard. The empty-
ness of British and French military and political threats was exposed.
The dawn (perhaps the premature dawn) of the pre-World War II "under-
developed" countries as significant world powers was heralded. To the
people who are always sympathetic of the underdog and who root for the
downtrodden, the Crisis held forth hope of a "fair" tomorrow. At the
same time, other, more significant (to the United States) perceptions
were being formed. One of the most important was that the Suez Crisis
served to demonstrate the United States' commitment to maintaining the
status quo in yet another major world wide area (as the Marshall Plan had
done for Europe, Korea had done for the Far East, and Vietnam for Indo-
china). The United States had added another block to the beat of the
World's Policeman. Of perhaps eoual (and eventually, related) importance
was the clear demonstration that the problem of the regional conflict
between the Jewish and Islamic states had not been solved by the post-19^8
Vlar armistice agreements. One conclusion of the Suez Crisis/War was that
obviously Israel did not feel that her present territorial boundaries
provided the necessary security she found essential. Concurrently, th<
seemed little reason to believe that Egypt would hesitate to use the v< i y
existence of Israel (in the midst of the Moslem holy land) as a ra]
point for the manipulation of her internal political situation. There no
longer was any question whether or not the situation between Israel
U

Egypt i initely unstable. At the same time, although in a lower
key, at least some of the world had become alerted to the importance of
Middle East oil sources to the world economy. The Crisis disruption of
the normal flow of oil, the demonstrated weakness of the British position
in the area, and the disruption of the (British) economy as a. result of
I
the temporary reduction of Middle East oil supplies served to alert some
(of the more discerning observers) to the potential world-wide importance
of Middle East conflicts, and at the same time, it became obvious to some
that the question of support for Israel might become of more than mere
ideological interest for the industrialized nations of the West. Could
the West continue its battle with the East without the oil of the Middle
East? Could the West have the oil and Israel too?
Such a critical period provides an irresistable attraction for
commentators of all ideological color, and the Suez Crisis has received
the attention it demands. Scholars and reporters have attempted to
describe and explain the events as they saw/interpreted them. Many of
1 . More than academic interest in the United States in the status of
Middle Eastern oil (on the part of people other than those involved in
the production of oil) stems from 19^8, when the United States began
importing more crude oil and refined products than we were exporting.
For example see Bernard Brodie. Foreign Oil a.nd American Security .
(New Haven, Connecticut: Yale Institute of International Studies, 1°^7).
This interest took a rapid jump in 1956 when it became apparent that
Europe was highly susceptible to economic disruption as a result of
impediments in the free flow of oil from the Middle East and that future
disruptions were very likely. See Harold Lubell. M i dr lie East G i 1 C r i ; *
;
•
and VJestern Europe's Energy Supplies
.
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
Pre.™, 1963).
That the need for stockpiling of oil, which is essentially a rather
difficult (i.e. expensive) item to stockpile, was seen as critical to
one as a counter to the threat of disruption (an option discussed by
Lubell), can be seen by the situation which existed prior to the latesl
crisisi In early 1973 the United States had only a five day reserve of
oili On the other hand, England had a 105 day reserve, Western Europe
had 90 days and Sweden had 120 days reserve oil supplies stowed on na1 ; I
territory. Henry M. Jackson, "Needed: A Manhatten Project on Energy,"
r

these descriptive accounts lead inevitably to the author attempting,
primarily as an afterthought, to link events with the Crisis itself. At
the same time, other writers have undisguisably been interested in con-
centrating on the causal events which they felt were the foundations of
the Crisis. Although one would not maintain that simple divisions between
the various accounts can be drawn, it does seem that authors have tended
to follow one of two major different paths in their analysis. One group
seems to accept the principle that nations behave as rational actors.
That events can be best explained by picturing the nation as carefully
and deliberately determining the course of action which best serves the
"national interests," and then proceeding to carry out this decision.
This approach provides a convenient yardstick for determining which
events are crucial to a decision/action, for the theory ignores those
which do not appear rational, that is, do not appear to serve the purpose
which the nation has been postulated as intending. This approach is
often characterized as macrotheory.
The second major group of interpreters of the Crisis appears to have
been more interested in the individual(s) involved in the decision-making
oT the various international actors. This interest includes the indivi-
dual's own values, experiences and goals, his organizational, personal
and political debts, and the individual interactions of the people involved
in the decisionmaking. This theory does not provide any "yardstick" for
in Sea Power
.
(July, 1973), pp. 5-10.
2. A school of international relation which Niebuhr is generally >t lited
with initiating and of which Hans J. Morgenthau Is the most famou i ceni
• ictitioner, The most critical assumptidn to the theory Is thai il]
nations act rationally, or, in the manner which will accomplish bh< Lr
r ials at the least cost. Action which is inefficient (not In th<




deter .he importance of a various consideration, but instead
insists that the most complex issues often depend on items which the
rational actor group has casually thrown out with the garbage.-5 This
k
approach is often termed the microtheoredical approach.
Of course, many of the better authors tend to combine the two
approaches, commonly accepting the macrotheorist explanation for events
which they feel other authors have "misunderstood."
In addition to this natural tendency to devote the majority of the
available pages to correcting misimpressions an author feels others may
have fostered, is the particular problem of obtaining information in
Egypt during Nasser's regime. At first glance the problem does not
appear critical, for there are certainly enough biographies of Nasser.
It is when the student wishes to better understand some of the anti-Nasser
views (or other Egyptian views), that one becomes aware of the complete-
ness of the censorship Nasser imposed. By making it so difficult to
obtain opposing views, and by making himself so available for interviews,
Nasser did what can only be described as a superlative job of managing
3. One thinks of the comments (not too veiled as to their sexual refer-
ence) as to the "demands" of "Eden's new wife." Hugh Thomas. Sun?,
.
(New York: Harper & Row, 1966), p. _37» and similar comments by Mohammed
sanein Heikal. The Cairo Documents
.
(Garden City, New York: Double-
day, 1973), P. 116.
'»•. Or Governmental Politics model, that assumes "the decisions and
'ions of governments are international political resultants.
..
(occur-
ring) from compromise, conflict, and confusion of officials with diver •
Interests and unequal influence." Graham T. Allison. Essence of Deci -
sion
.
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971 ), p. 162, Probably in
id part due to the effectiveness of the spokesmen for the the*
(Allison, Morton Halperin), the bureaucratic theory is currently ir
v<-vue. While the amount of data required to efTeot i vMy nnMv 1-
n in a bureaucratic manner is so prohibitive an to ensure the irn '
can seldom be applied as an exp] natory tool, and the model dons n- '
predict in an exact manner, the bureaucratic model does serve a heurl ' I !
value by alerting the student and decision-maker to the myriad - '" 1 i-
derations which should be understood.
7

the Egypt n news scene.-5 In the face of this inability to obtain the
necessary detail and depth of knowledge about Egyptian bureaucratic con-
siderations, it does not seem at all unexpected that those authors who
have been interested in "fully" explaining the Crisis, have been driven
in general to accept the rational actor model for Egypt's actions and to
delve into bureaucratic factors only in the cases of those actors
who Dermit (and encourage) the unfettered exchange of information.
Since in the case of the Crisis, the Western nations (particularly the
United States and then England to a lesser extent) were the actors whose
decision-maker's actions were subject to the most public scrutiny, it
might be expected that those who dwell on the bureaucratic explanation
of the causal events of the Crisis, would be inclined (whatever their
personal inclination) to concentrate on these two actors to the exclusion
of those actors who did not encourage or even permit in-depth journalis-
tic and/or scholarly searching. Thus, in the case of the Crisis, one
mifcht adopt a modifier term for the microtheorist, and might retitle that
5. One is struck by the number of "biographies" of Nasser which exist
in the English language and the absolute paucity of information on the
remainder of the Free Officers or on the bureaucratic conflicts th
occurred during the first four years of their reign. On the subject of
the strictness of censorship during Nasser's rule, see Keith Wheelock.
!'-s:'.r;r's New Egypt
.
(New York: Praeger, I960), pp. 22, 35 and 39. For
icific comments on Nasser's management of the press see Jean and Simi 1
Lacouture. Egypt in Transition
.
(New York: Critierion Books, 1958),
p. 298, or Robert St. John, The Boss . (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1Q*0),
pp. 239~2'4-0 and J[k. For an example of the wealth of new information
which seems destined to become aval
I
1 le as a result of Sadat's attem]
to establish his own political Ltimacy (at the expense of some the
followers of Nasser) see Arnaud de Borchgrave, "Anti-Nasser Drive Bern
in Cairo," The Washington Post
. (25 March, IQ7'0, p. A L7.
6, This inclination in genera] wor' to bhe definite disai vanl
tor which docs not engage in censorship, as "bureaucratic" behav]
either "naturally" appears (or can be made to do so v^ry easily) ai
lid (or at least not as self-sacrificing), then t.ho motives of "natj
interest," for which the rational actor supposedly acts.
<?

school as the micro-internationalist, by which is meant that the authors .
tend to use microanalysis only on the international (non-Egyptian) scene.
By these definitions, I am trying to pry apart the two major theories
in current use to permit the inclusion of a third (which is at least
somewhat different), at least in the case of the Suez Crisis of IQ56.
My hypothesis is that perhaps a major portion of the Suez Crisis can be
explained by an approach which is directly opposite to the micro-
internationalist—that perhaps the Suez Crisis can be largely explained
by concentrating exclusively on Egyptian domestic politics. An important
difference between this latter approach and that of the micro-
internationalist is that, since Egypt was obviously the major actor in
the Middle East at the time of the Suez Crisis, it may be feasible to
largely explain the cause of the Crisis with only negligible consideration
of external factors. If this is true, we can avoid the distortion which
I feel is inherent in any analysis which must deal with rational actor
explanations (and those which combine rational actor explanations for
some nations with bureaucratic explanations for other nations would
apnear, at least on the face of it, to be potentially the most distorted
of all). For the purpose of labeling, I will term the study of Egyptian
domestic politics, as postulated as the primary cause of the Suez Crisis
(to the virtual exclusion of external factors), as micro-Egyptian theory.
Some background to my interpretation of the Suez Crisis appears
necessary. Perhaps the best way to present it is to discuss the macro-
theoredical and micro-internationalist explanations of the Crisis, so
that they may be contrasted ho micro-Egyptian theory
.
Rational actor explanations start with the history of Western 1
rlalism in Erypt. Originating as an effort in safeguarding the lnv«

merits of Europeans in the Egyptian economy, the British interest in Egypt
spread to a denial of other power hedgemony over this critical link
between Europe and the Far East, This (often thinly disguised) control
of Egyptian affairs "by non-Egyptians was not acceptable in the rise of
nationalistic fervor following World War II, but England was reluctant
to give up the position of dominance for which she had (in part at least)
fought two world wars, Egypt was faced with continued British efforts
to maintain and/or reassert their hedgemony in the area. Thus Egypt was
forced to look to the East for a counterbalancing power to contain the
British imperialistic thrusts. This appeal to the East was made feasible
because Egypt realized that she did not border a Communist state,
. was protected by the Northerh Tier, »wlsV« ^s thus fully protected
from Communist territorial aggrandizement,
Egypt was also concerned with the threat of Israel. While she felt
that Israel was in part the operationalization of British and American
imperialistic intrusions into the Middle East, Egypt was willing to reach
an accommodation with her if they could do so without becoming isolated
in the Arab world. Unfortunately, Israeli continued aggressions against
Egypt's territorial integrity convinced Egypt that peace could not be
negotiated from a position of military weakness. United States and
British failure to provide Egypt defensive arms, in order to pressure
7
: ypt to join in anti-communist pacts, was relucta.ntly countered by
Egypt by the arrangement with Soviet Russia for arms.
Egypt's continued actions ta T;en as an independent, state (e.g. tl
recognition of Communist China) served to convince the Western powi
7. See J. C. Hurewltz, "Egypt: Military Hule In a Rapidly CI in Ln
Society," Kan, State, and Society in I. he Contemporary Middle ivi:,'. . Jacob
M. Landau (ed.) (New York: Pracger, IWt)
, p. *1 .
to

that Egypt would not again permit imperialistic penetration, and that
Egypt was anti-Western in orientation. Faced with these conclusions,
the West decided that their aid money could be "better spent elsewhere,
but justified this conclusion by blaming the unsatisfactory state of the
Egyptian economy. Egyut, confronted with this calculated insult, acted
to restore her international prestige by nationalizing the Canal.
England's position with respect to Egypt was bound up in the problems
of the British need for access to the remains of their imperial dominion
as represented by the oil empire in the Arabian Gulf and the Commonwealth
nations Australia and New Zealand. England's economic life was dependent
upon her continued cheap access to markets and raw materials so that she
could continue her age-old policy of importing raw materials, food (and
lately, energy sources) and the exportation of finished products. In
this complex trade system, which depended on the free use of traditional
sea routes, the Canal had a prominent position. Not only did 85% of the
oil-energy which was used to finish the imported raw materials pass
through the canal, but also 60-85% of the trade with the aforenoted
Commonwealth partners passed through the canal. ° Unless the untrained
Egyptians could operate the Canal as well as the Europeans, the losi '
would not be the Egyptians (who could and probably would raise the to] Ls
,
but the British people. Interwoven with this consideration was the
3. For example see the description in The World Alman.-ic . (i -V :
Worldr-Telegram, 1965), p. 3^7. "Britain import:-, all ^r Mr, oil, d
.
rubber, sulphur, four-fifths of Its wool, half of Its food and Li
also certain amounts of naper, tobacco, chemicals. Manufactured
made from these basic materials have been exported since the Lndustria]
age began."
9. Mezerid, A. G. (ed.). The Liu ok C-m.-il . (New York: Internatii
Review Service, February 1957) » Appendices K and L, p. 'if'.
//

importance of the infrastructure and supplies in the Canal zone to the
British military (and thus in some part, diplomatic capabilities) in the
area. Although the British had reluctantly agreed not to maintain a
military force in the Canal, they had retained both the right to store
military supplies there and the right of reentry in the event of confla-
i
gration.in the area which threatened their vital interests. Additionally,
England was not about to give up He<- strategic position in the area--
1the Baghdad pact was evidence enough of that. At the same time, Egypt
was acting in direct opposition to British interests. Not only was
Egypt's brand of nationalism (and their exportation and exhortation
thereof) proving to be a disturbing influence in the area, there appeared
to be ample evidence that Egypt was trying to substitute her own influence
for that of England throughout the area (particularly in Jordan and Iraq).
At the same time, Egypt appeared to be taking advantage of England's
reluctance to take unfair advantage of her "great power" nowers. Epynt
appeared to be using the tools of weak states (i.e. terrorism and propa-
ganda) to force England out of areas which England had a real interest
in, and which Egypt did not. There appeared to be the need for England
to take decisive action with respect to her recent protectorate.* *
1.0. For a discussion of Britain's refusal to accept the limitations
imposed by the deterioration of her position in the Middle East, see
C. F. Hudson, "The Great Catastrophe," The Middle East In Tr;m,;U.i',n .
Walter Z. Laoueur (ed.). (New York: Praeger, 1950). pp. 115-8.
11. V/hich was right in linn with England's later. I i<- ! 'inns in the
In March l°5^i they had deported Archbishop Makarios and the I
Kyrenia from Cyprus to the Seychelles for the stated reason of punishment
for the officials "terrorist links." The real reason, however,
to be Makarios failure to agree to British proposals on Cyprn consl Ltu-
tional plans. Anthony Eden. Full Circle . (Bostont Houghton Mifflin
Comnany, IQ^O), pn. W-0-460.
/2-

'j rotheoredical explanation of United States Middle East policy-
discusses United States actions (or non-actions) as the logical result
of a simplistic approach to the area in which America carried over ideas
from other regions (primarily the Anglo-American special relationship
and the need for active anti-Communism efforts on the part of all parti-
I
cinants) and applied these (in general, unsuitable) concepts to the
Middle East. America was convinced that there was a definite threat to
the peace in the form of the communist ideology, and that both the theo-
redical (a la Kennan) and practical answer to this threat lay in the
policy of containment. Since this policy generated the requirement for
alliances between the Western nations and all areas which might become
subject to communism, and since Egypt's nationalistic policies required
that ea.ch nation in the Middle East avoid those same "entangling alli-
ances," the policies were bound to generate friction. The United States
viewed Egypt's actions as tantamount to asking for assistance (aid) while
simultaneously not only refusing to enlist in the worldwide fight arainst
democracy's real enemy, but actually if not aiding, at the very least
acting in a manner which served to weaken the Western position. Not
only did the Egyptian action appear at the minimum, suspicious, it also
had resulted in a rising chorus of reproachments from nations who were
not the recipients of as much American aid as Egypt, but who were coop-
erating fully in the fight against Communism.
12. For an account of Turkey's d.1 I asu with America's aid poll
see Terrence Robertson. Crisis . (Mew York: Atheneum, t°' r)), p. '
For succinct phrasing of the nrohlom onn cnn go to I'm Le --"do i
which play both sides pet : '< ment than nations which li
wart and work with us?" Townsend Hoopes. Tim Devil and John !'":,' r
Dulles
.
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1°73), p. 117.

The other "great power" which was involved in the Crisis was France,
and her policy objectives appear very clear-cut. France was involved in
a conflict in Algeria which consumed her every interest.-^ Since there
was a plethora of evidence that the war had "been initiated with, guided
from and resupplied by, E?rypt, France had for some time been actively
searching for a reason and means of either distracting Egypt from Algeria,
or, better yet, teaching her not to meddle in other's affairs.
The final participant in the Suez Crisis was Israel. A rational
examination of her policies quickly arrives at the conclusion that she
is totally involved in the question of physical security. During the
period l c>5^-6, Israel was quite concerned that her physical security was
13. Roy Pierce. French Politics and Political Institutions . (New York:
Harper and Row, 1068)
,
p. 44. "Before 1 953 f French political crises
turned principally on domestic policy. After 1953 t they turned mainly
on overseas policy. .. .The regime foundered. . .on the rock of Algeria."
It is also important to realize France's military commitment in Algeria,
Their military troops increased from 83,000 in February 1955 to 250,000
in Anril. 195^, with a rise to 400,000 before the year was over. This
1 In a nation one-fifth the size of the United States. Alf Andn
;oy. Insurgency and Couritorinsurgency in Algeria . (Bl oomington:
< University Press, 1972), pp. 79, 174-5 and 100.
L4. "(l)n 1952, Ben Bella and Mahsas escaped from prison in Bl irla.
out and Ben Boulaid broke out of their cell in Bone. All somehow
to Cairo, where they joined Ait Ahmed and Mohammed Kinder, both o r whom
A 1 -eria in 1050." He oy, op. cit
. , p. 35- Although
'ion of Egyptian support (ol'r c than moral) Is poohpoohed by so 1
such as Kenneth Love. Su":-, Tho T, ht V/ar
.
(New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1969)1 at least one repu urce has acknowled
of at least some of the chari ei - " ., t'i d vision to hi Lp the V]
taken so that, in Nasser's wor-i ' e will make them need th Lr
1 Algeria so that they will not be bl to jive them to Israel.
oblige thorn to use them far away from us so that they will not bi
against us."' Heikal, on. £JJ_. , p.

being undermined, both by the growing success of the economic blockade,
and by the relative and real improvement in Egyptian military capabilities.
The Fedayeen raids aside, it appeared obvious that Egypt did not intend
to live up to the spirit of the armistice agreements. Given that atti-
tude on the part of the Egyptians, and considering the relative size and
resource base of the Arab versus Jew alignment, it was in Israel's inter-
ests to use military action to neutralize the Sinai Peninsula before the
Egyptians had fully assimilated all of their new Russian weaponry.
When we turn to microtheory, most people begin with England. Most
probably this is because England appears as the biggest loser of the
Crisis. Her base rights in the Canal zone were lost irrevocably, and
her departure from the rest of the Arab world was accellerated, if not
initiated by the event. Acting in conjunction with the Israeli's was
certain to antagonize those very Middle Eastern governments whose con-
tinued friendship was so critical to the British Middle East policy.
Snrland had already withdrawn her military presence from the Canal. It
was impossible for her to militarily react expeditiously, and it was
obvious that England was politically divided on the need, for a show of
force. Why did she choose this most inopportune occasion to make a
15« Reference to the extreme effectiveness of the blockad'e (in many
es they are inadvertent testimonials) are contained in several :
it nntahle in Iigel Allon. "The Arab-Israeli Conflict-Some Sui
Solutions," In International Affair:-,. (^0« 205-21 8, April, l'VJ\); Da
Pen-Curlon. Israel; Yoarr-, of Challenge
.
(Hew York: Holt, Rlneharl
and Winston, 1 963
)
', the chapter entitled "Looking to the Future," in
Earl Tlorn-nr. The Covenant and the Swmi-1
.
( London i Routledre &
Paul, 1 965 ) j and Walter Eytan. The [) rr,l Ton Ye-nrs . (Now York
l
and Schuster, 1958), pp. 90-11 5.
I61 For a generally accepted estimate of t 1 "' balance, see Moshi
Pi
.-u.-y of the Sinai Campaign
.
(New Yorki Harper & Row, l ^), | .
5.

Man -mmentators direct attention to the Prime Minister. They
point out his ill health, ' his experiences with appeasement with Hitler,
and the impression that his personal political legitimacy was built on a
foundation of accomplishments in the foreign policy area., not the least
of which included the Canal Treaty of 1°36 which he had signed, and the
treaty of 19^U which he had approved and which he had personally defended
1 Qin 'Parliament and on the hustlings. 7 Other factors which come in for
their share of analysis are Conservative party (inter-party) politics
20
which required that a decisive stand be taken, and the public reaction
to Egypt's Middle East tactics which had already resulted in the humiliat-
ing firing of Glubb Pasha, and were producing a rapid deterioration in
the British position in Jordan. At the same time the anti-American feeling
17. Anthony Nutting. No End of a Lesson
.
(New York: Potter, 19^7)
gives particular emphasis to the aspect of Eden's serious problems with
his gall bladder during the period before and during the Crisis. One
wonders if this is not because if Eden's actions (which were exceedingly
evil and foolish in Nutting's view) were due to a character fault which
he had before the Crisis, Nutting himself would be tainted, since he had
politically risen by his close attachment to Eden's coattails.
IB. For Eden's description of the period between his IO38 resignation
and the beginning of war, see Anthony Eden. The Reckoning. (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1°65), pp. Jff, Many authors have extrapolated this
experience into a cognitive set which would prove disasterous to his
relationship with Nasser. Robertson, op. ci_t.
,
38 describes Eden as
"particularly sensitive to charges of appeasement. There was in the
Conservative party cupboard, a skelton named Munich and no one felt its
isence more anxiously than the Prime Minister."
19. For a description of the length to which Eden committed himself to
defending the treaty on the basis thai it did not give away eith c Eng-
land's legal position in the Canal or the rest of the Middle East,
for the acrimonity of the debate which resulted in the Party Whi ] ai-
from the Party, see Leon D. Epstein. British Pol i tics in I I
Cr'sls
.
(Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1964), pp. 31-1 .
i
.
Nutting, oj>. c 1
1
. , pp. 23ff discusses the economic problem! racing
England immediately following the election and bhe Labour 1 p osll Lo
charges of connivance and hesitant action. Epstein, on. clt.
, p,




which resulted from American opposition to British policy in the Gulf
21
area, served to encourage independent British action.
United States "bureaucratic considerations are laid primarily to
particular considerations of the Senate and the Secretary of State,
1 22
although Eisenhower's health is also considered a factor by some. ' The
primary microtheoredical considerations are involveri with an analysis of
the Secretary of State. His proclivity for the framing of questions in
religious contexts and his abiding hatred of Communism are all brought
forth and examined to determine their effects upon his actions. * At the
same time domestic political considerations are not neglected, and atten-
tion is drawn to the interest and (perhaps counterbalancing?) lobbies in
the Congress which were concerned about continued United States access to
Gulf oil. Other Congressional pressures detailed are due to the fact
that aid for the Aswan Dam would be an indirect subsidy for a foreign
nation to be better able to compete economically with a product (cotton)
which several states grew as their large cash crop. In addition, the
21. Epstein, op. cit
.
,
points out a critical aspect of British under-
standing of the Middle East—"Englishmen had fought in one world war to
win the Middle East and the other to hold it. They were surely convinced
"
r its importance, .. .More than elsewhere, the Middle East, even in Wo]
ir II, had been an area where British arms seemed, to have been dominant
md decisive. Here the command and the bulk of the forces were not Amer-
n. The wartime accomplishments were British, and they were consider-
ble." pp. 23-5- Later (p. 5$) Epstein notes a basic anti-American ir. Li
England based on perceived American anti-British, anti-colonial feel 1 ' .
Hoopes, op_. cit
. , p. 331 , attributes at least part of Eisenhower's
Failure to fight for the case for Aswan aid to his weakened condition
caused by his heart attack. Love, oj>. cit
. . p. 325t notes Eisenhower's
intestinal operation for ileitis,
'
', Hoopes, op_. cit
. , p. J15t discusses Dulles' and American feeU
"Communism was evil incarnate, the anti thesis of everything free
cent In human affairs," In Hoopes' "Cod and John Foster Dull- ,"
rornign Policy
.
(l3, Winter, 1973 J i), p. 171, he attributes to Dulles a
"self-righteous and apocalyptic style."
/-)

problem of the Aswan aid request being out-of-cycle with the normal
bureaucratic budget process (and the increased political visibility of
the item that would result/had resulted) is attributed by some as the
final straw as far as the President was concerned. Others have sug-
gested that bureaucratic trading was involved, and that since the United
States had supported ARAMCO against the British' on the question of terri-
torial claims to Buraimi, and had refused to put teeth into the Triparite
Declaration, the "special relationship" and our greater interests (NATO
harmony) dictated that we follow the British lead in the case of the
Aswan aid. -^
Bureaucratic explanations of French motives are in large measure
just amplification of the macrotheory explanation of the French commit-
ment in Algeria. Given the importance of success in Algeria to both
•foreign and domestic policies this does not seem infeasible.
Concurrent factors which affected French reactions (although not to
the same extent) and considerations of the French identification viith and
i
''
. Nasser had delayed his decision on the aid until any apnropriati ons
ild have to be approved via a suppl omental budget request, a tricky
enough item to maneuver through Congress on the most, neutral of issues,
h less on one upon which the Senate Appropriations Committee
already taken a public stand against. See pp. 323~^ •{ H^o**, op. ert
25. For this "horse-trading" explanation see Thomas, op_. c i.
t
. , p, 2.2,
Some indications of the French co mltment were that the A]
Liament was dissolved in April 1"' , in June the first A'
rebels were executed (Heggoy, ot). cit . , p, 173) and ,hn resident ml
began to rule by decree (p. I83T. Finally, in October, Ben ;




investment in Egypt, 2? discussions on the condition of the French armed
services* morale, and discussions of the French citizen's identifica-
tion with the Israeli government experiment. ^9
Israel offers a fertile field for microtheory analysis. Scholars
I
have identified as critical Israel's loss of diplomatic power, which
required her to subsequently rely on military power;-' the failure of the
27. More than 200,000 Frenchmen were shareholders in the Suez Canal.
Which means that practically every Frenchman knew someone who was affected
by the Nationalization. For one discussion of this effect see Terence
Robertson. Crisis: The Inside Story of the Suez Conspiracy . (New York!
Atheneum, 1965)1 p. xiii.
?.R. The French military had suffered an ignomi^ous defeat in the Second
World War, and a political one in Vietnam two years previously. They had
been' involved, in a civil war in Algeria since 1952. Most authors imply
that the military would like a short, easy involvement which they could
win decisively for a change.
90
. As a fellow socialistic country which was itself being harrassed by
the same nation (Egypt) that was snapping at French heels in Algeria. It
seems worth noting, however, that French anl.i -semiticism had V:en l.he
reason for the birth of the modern Zionist movement (see Leslie Derfler,
The Dreyfus Affair
.
(Boston: Heath, 1 9^3 ))» anrl- there was surely no
problem after the death of the Fourth Republic two years later in turn.
French policy toward Israel completely around.
30. Israel's deterioration with Russia during the years 19^7-5'J is do
LI by Yaacov Ro'i. "Soviet-Israeli Relations," in The U.S.u.R and 1
le East . M. Confino and S. Shamir (eds.). (New York: Wiley, l r "> lj,
pp. t?.3-t^l. Israel's deterioration in relations with the Unit
•obably can be attributed to the State Department asserting the primacy
of its considerations of American ir<- nts in bhe area, particu
in the absence of strong executive prei ire for Israel. An exci
liscussion of the anti-Israeli set of British public oplnl m u '
<^ r the Britir.h Mandate expi oe J 1 ital ed in Christopher Syl
sroads to Israel
.
(Cleveland! Thi forld Publishing Company, ' ' .
For example—"the daily abomination! ' bhe Jewish ten It-
red thousands of them (English troops) a Insl : who] iv, Tl
oart of the nrice that innocent Jewish men and women had bo pay f
the (Jewish) Agency's needless act or d< I Ion in combining with 1




United Nations to prove effective in the Middle East;-^ and the failure
of a moderate Israeli government to achieve a settlement.-' At the same
time, the internal politics of Mapai and the Histadrut are seen- as impor-
tant, 33 as are the personal perceptions of the Prime Minister and the
Army Chief of Staff.
^
31. Israel had herself acted in complete disregard of United Nations'
directives during the second truce period of the 19^-8 war, mounting
attacks again and again in order to secure desirable territory. In 1951
»
it was Egypt's turn as she ignored the United Nations Resolution
S/22°8/Rev. 1 which was "calling upon" Egypt to end her illegal restric-
tion of goods to/from Israel via the Canal. Another resolution, intro-
duced into the Security Council in 1 95^> and directed toward, the same end,
was vetoed by Russia. A discussion of these matters and all other United
Nations actions is contained in Fred J. Khouri, The Arab-Israeli Dilemma
.
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1968), Particular references to
the above can be found on pp. 84-95, 207 and 372.
12. During Sharett's fifteen months in office Israel's diplomatic position
had deteriorated, border transgressions had continued, trade deficits had
increased, and worse of all, the Israeli army had been at the minimum,
embarrassed, and nrobably seriously weakened by the public denouncement
nlting from the Lavon affair. One of the better discussions of the
mifications of the latter is contained in Shabtai Teveth. Mor.ho ;/• n .
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Comnany, 1073), pp. 227-231, 290, 2Q6-300, and
305-6.
33. See the above (#32) discussion on the Lavon Affair. Also Peter Y.
Lng, Mapai in Israel
.
(Cambridge: University Press, L972), espe-
1 illy pp. 261-298 for a discussion of the conflict between the charis-
1 c and the party.
3^1 One might propose that one way to explain Dayan's rapid (and unde-
irved?) rise in Israel/Mapai was bee u - he shared with his men'
(l m-Gurion) a cognitive theory aboul military ease with which the
bs could be routed, an opinion which had been formed by Dayan" '"m
1
1 experience, when durl For ; -'"' Deganias "I saw '
they dropped everything and fled... they were at a total loss, With <~"ir
rth shell the entire Syrian attack collapses. They retreati < with
ling attacked. .. .1 thought then that you jusl have to bang once on -• tin
and they will all scatter like birds," This experience war, then rein-
forced in his engagement at Lydda. Tevi th, on. cit « . np. Un and I '''- .

Before returning to my micro-Egyptian theory, it is necessary to
acquire a cognitive set which will support this explanation. It is thus
essential to discuss some Egyptian history in order to develop some
aspects that many authors either disregard or denigrate. Of course, in
discussing the events of 1952-1956, which are of primary importance with
i
regard to the Crisis, it is necessary to deal with some history which is
even earlier. While it is obviously important, I think one can simply
accept that Egypt was under foreign domination for about 2500 years before
the Free Officer's revolt, and that the British domination, beginning in
about 1882, was only the latest of a long history of occupation. The
first significant event for my purposes is the forming of the Wafd poli-
tical party as an outgrowth of the efforts of Sa'd Zaghlul to form a
delegation and receive British permission to present Egypt's case for
independence to the nations at the Paris Peace Conference following World
War I. The importance of this event was at least three-fold. In the
first place it became obvious that the British could be subjected to
successful terrorism, for their initial refusal and subsequent capitula-
tion after a few British citizens were killed was not the action of a
strong occunier. Secondly, the Egyptians were successful in their strat-
egy of appealing to "world opinion" to deliver them from a situation they
could not surmount themselves. 35 And. finally, Zaghlul's success in ending
the Egyptian legal position as a British protectorate in 1922 and the
fining of a Constitution in 1923 firmly established the Wafd as the
party of Egyptian nationalists. The continued success of this party,
which had no ideology except nationalism and which apre;iloi] to the ei
spectrum of Egyptian citizenry sufficiently to remain the Largesi vi
35. See Lacouture, oj>. cit
. , pp. 86-9' , ':cially 88-9,
>2/

getter in every election throughout the three decades of Egyptian consti-
tutional government, must he considered as a statement of the overriding
interest of the Egyptian people throughout the twentieth century, 3°
The second event I consider particularly significant was the apnli-
cation and acceptance of the Egyptian Socialistic Party to the COMINTERN
i
in 1922. After a quick name change (to the Egyptian Communist Party),
the second major party which would last until the revolt of 1952 appeared.
In what was the forerunner of legitimate political calls for land reform,
the Communists called for limiting the largest individual landowner to a
maximum of 100 feddan (there is- about one acre per feddan ) . At the same
time, they called for nationalization of the Suez Canal.-5 '
A note is appropriate at this point. Hopefully my purpose is
already blatantly apparent. I am struck by the apparent "naturalness" of
the actions which the Free Officers took in the 1950s. I am convinced
that Nasser was, practically completely, a product of his time and the
Egyptian experience. In this context, I would like to trace the main
political ideas which entered the 1950s (without Nasser) in order to
determine whether or not Nasser developed new, legitimate, political
aspirations as a result of the international scene (i.e. due to the
36. For a history of the Wafd's political predecessor and other early
Egyptian political parties, see Jamal Mohammed Ahmed. The Intellectual
ins of Egyptian Nationalism
.
(New York: Oxford University Press,
19^0), especially pp. 11/+-11 5. The support for the Wafd declined for
tsons that will be apparent, but there was still sufficient support in
19'-l-9 elections for the Wafd to receive the largest per cent (' l(V) of
the vote' cast. Anouar Abdel-Malek. Egypt : Mill tary Soc i n t,y . (New V-
Vintage, 1968), p. 29.
17. Walter Z. Laqueur. Communism and Nal.lonali ;-.m in the Middle- K;i :•.!.
.
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1 05^, ) , pp. 3'* —35- For r-on-o of t!-o




. , pp. 50~86j Wheeloc'', op_. clt . . np. 7^—108 and Gabrle] i
yptian Attitudes Towards Land Reform, i. n;'2-1955." Tim Middle K:. 1 in
Transition
.
Laqueur, op . clt . . pp. 80-99«

actions of other nations), or whether there already existed a set of
Egyptian political goals to which Nasser had to subscribe in order to
remain in power.-' Thus I am interested in tracing and in determining
the legitimacy of the land, reform movement, the question of what the
Canal's status should be, the Egyptian attitude toward the Western and
i
Eastern powers, the strength of the -nan-Arab movement, and various other,
perhaps less significant, political goals. In addition, for purposes
which will be apparent later, I am interested in determining whether or
not there were legitimate political movements established in Egypt, and
if so, what their platforms were and what was the extent of their public
support
,
The next important event is dated from about 1°28. This is the
formation of the Moslem Brotherhood. To fully appreciate the strength
that the Brotherhood movement later acquired, it is necessary to touch
on the historical reaction of the Islamic culture to the successful
encroachments of the West, When forced to evaluate the apparent superi-
ority of the Western civilization (in comnarison to his own), the Mof.]nm
was practically limited to three reactions. He could advocate the elim-
ination of the influence of Islam unon the culture (secularization) and
propose the adoption of Western modes of thought and actions (a la Ataturk){
he could attempt to I've with both the Islamic religion and Western Ideas
simultaneously, a sort of partial secularization, which required nnch
individual to accept many contradictions in his daily life, and generally
produces a lessening of the faith as Individuals tended to rationalize
their own lives; or the Moslem could advocate a renewal of faith and e
I
r ing of society of the effects of the foreign contamination which h
38, What is the phrase about "There go the masses, I must catch For
I am their leader."?
23

been experienced. For the Moslem who was strongly attracted "by the
spiritual message, and who had seen no tangible results from the other
policies, the latter appeared as the only possible alternative. 3' It was
in this fertile ideological field that the self-help religious movement
known as the Moslem Brotherhood took root. The Brotherhood called for a
l
rededication to the teachings of the Prophet, for a removal of all foreign
(British) presence from the country, and for the improvement of each
Egyptian through community cooperative programs. Even though the move-
ment appeared to be a reaction of the times, it also was immeasurably
aided by the personal magnetic charisma of its founder and initial leader
(Hasan al-Banna). Under al -Banna's driving personal leadership, the
39. "The ideologies of the West must be resisted: they are the forward
arm of corruption. .. .Islam, . .is sufficient in itself for the renaissanci
of the nation." Richard P. Mitchell. The SocieLy of the Muslim Brotivr- ,
(London: Oxford University Press, 196°), p. 23?. Ahmed, op. c i L . , n. :
notes that "The Muslim Brothers challenged the fundamental assumption of
the historical development of modern Egypt: the assumption that theri
a. unified modern civilization, called into existence by Western Europe,
I that Egypt must form part of it."
V). For descriptions of Al Banna which are inevitably highly flatl ,
rdless of the author's opinion of the Brotherhood as a religious
I /or political movement, see Christina Phelps Harris. II- 1 ' i r- _^
( volution in Egynt
.
(London: Moutoi Ss Co., 196^)1 J. Heyworth-Duni .
iVol igious and Political Trends in Modern Egypt . (Washington: By bl
Author, 1950)j Ishak Musa Husaini, The Mo",lcrn Brethren . (Beirut:
- hayats, 1956)j and Mitchell, op., cit . While the lh
cited as an authoritarian work on m bject, the Mitchell book
1" complete and balancer!, while the Hi irth- lun Is
, Later efforts (po6t-Nasser's coup oi Lon attempt) bi
ve or disprove a -particular point aboul bhe Irotl
'• was in large part writti l°52i and no section 1
r than 1955, ^o it war, 1- ' ' I by the climatic event!
part or that year and the beginning or > xt.
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Brotherhood, grew rapidly and by 1937 branches of the movement were
being formed in other Islamic countries. It is of particular interest
to realize that the first such branch was formed in Syria (Damascus).
Simultaneously the ideological call for pan-Islamism was broadcast by
the Brotherhood throughout the Middle East.
M. Accurate figures on Moslem Brotherhood, membership are not available,
but estimates by several authorities are in rough agreement and emphasize
the significance of the movement. In a country of only twenty million
people, in the late lQ^Os, the Brotherhood claimed 500,000 active members
and an equal number of sympathizers. This was equivalent to more than
35% of the total vote cast in the 1°4°- elections, and is indicative of
the Brotherhood's dominant position in Egyptian politics in the early
years of Nasser's reign. Mitchell, op. cit
. , pp. 328ff. See Abdel-
Malek, op. cit
. , p. 29, for the total 1°49 vote count.
h?_, Husaini, op. cit .
,
p. 75. Egypt's ties to Syria early in the Nasser
regime may have been at least in part based upon the Moslem relationship.
Some indication of both that and the closeness of the relationship
between the two countries is seen by the fact tha.t the first ambassador
to Syria after the Coup was General Neguib's brother, 'Ali, Mitchell,
on
. cit ., p. 15^. For the comments of another author on the relationship
of the Egyptian pan-Arabic movement and the Moslem religion se" Nadav
Safran. Egypt in Search of Political Community . (Cambridge! Harvard
University Press, I961), pp. 2.^6-7. "In Egypt the idea of a un'on of
the Arab countries had its roots in a religious motive. The first seri-
ous consideration of such an idea took place in 1924-1 925p in the course
of the agitation over restoring the caliphate, which had just been abol-
ished by Ataturk. . .the proposal was revived time and time again with the
encouragement of the king, who expected it to bring him not only an
enlarged realm, but enlarged powers as well. Each time, however, tl
idea of an Arab caliphate was resisted by the V/afd and. the other 11a ri-
al ist parties on the grounds of principle as well as of party self
Interest. In the meantime, the promotion of the cause of an A
preliminary to a Muslim union was taken up by independent popul
Lzations, such as the Association of Muslim Youth and the Mil ilim
hood.. During the Second World War, propitious political circum
in the Levant, the encouragement of the British, the spread of tl
of an Arab union along with the growth of the Brotherhood, and
that the kin 0- might take the initiative himself, Lnducei
government to abandon its negative attitude md to
Ar'ib cooperation that would sat!l ify bhe 1 '< pan-AraD pre
; Ficing Egypt's sovereignty and Its own constitutional ord< .
result was the pact of the Arab League. . .(and) bh< nlti I
....Behind this commitment. ' m< c mblnation of riving
ces.
.
.a broad, popular, religious-1 dred en • < Muslims
which is given outward expression in secul ir and

While i he following comments are out of historical order, it seems
reasonable to digress at this point to discuss events which drastically
weakened the Brotherhood "before Nasser's revolt, and which probably
assisted Nasser in politically outmaneuvering the Brotherhood during the
lQ50s. The critical event for the Brotherhood was the assassination of
their charismatic Genera.l Guide in 1949. ^ The succession conflict
within the Brotherhood resulted in the all-too-common experience of a
splintering of the Brotherhood leadership and the election of a very
weak, politically compromised leader who did not possess a political
"sense." This outcome of the succession problem immeasurably weakened
the Brotherhood, and made them ready prey to anyone (or any organization)
which was willing to play off against each other different leaders who
aspired to be the General Guide.
Returning to the historical chronology, and recalling that the
Brotherhood had just issued a call for nan-Islamism within the Arab
world, it seems significant that only three years later, a. logical
leaders of the country."
'4-3. For which no culprit was ever found, but since it was done in
retaliation for an assassination of a Prime Minister which had been
credited (probably incorrectly) to the Brotherhood, one is suspicious
of the Government's motives. It is noteworthy that when Nasser wished





. For a discussion of the personalities in bhe fight for leadership,
see Kitchen, op . bit . For a discussion of the personality of the com-
promise candidate, Hasan Ismail Hudaybi, and a description (without
' u sion) of his fatal weaknesses, Husainl, op. c i t . , pp. 111 r r.
"f his weaknesses were that he was related by marriage to the R
family, and by friendship to members of the Palace politli .
He was a definite member of the stal - quo having b» en a judj e foi ne
three decades, and. his health was very poor, Leadin to later mei
•rioratlon. Other weakness! rent during hi', teiun
,
i '. was obvious that ho was lacking in appreciation for the flrmrv
decision the conflict with the Fre> r's required, bu1 I n '
a consideration for the moment.
Jit

extension of this call for regional mutual cooperation was sounded under
the title of pan-Arabism. The initiator of this call was none other
than the Egyptian Prime Minister (Ali Mather). It is significant to
note that authors generally attribute his advocacy of the concept of
pan-Arabism as an attempt to demonstrate to the other Arab countries that
Egypt could establish a foreign policy separate from the influences of
the British. Since British presence and control was common throughout
the Middle East (at that time), Mather's call for pan-Arabism and his
strong pose as the champion of Arab rights was not only a not-too-subtle
call for Arab nationalism, it also was an example of an Egyptian leader
attempting to divert attention from domestic acquie^sence to foreign
domination, by mounting a verbal assault on the same domination present
in other area countries. ^ Unfortunately for this pose, increased
British requirements for security due to the war effort resulted in a
stifling of these Egyptian efforts. The conclusion of this era was when
the British used military force to obtain Mather's dismissal in t°; i2.
While this action (or at least the result of this action) was seen by
the British as an essential part of their elimination of overt Axis
sympathy, with Rommel at the gates of Egypt, the event is credited by
many Egyptian patriots as providing the spark that ignited the flame of
l ' r
<. For a formulation of this particular theory see Heyworth-Dunne,
op
. cit
. . p. 2^. For a discussion of thr British intentions In the
encouragement of the establishment of the Arab League, see Elli KerL
"Pan-Arabism and British Policy," La [Ueur, Transition , op . ell. ., p .
108-110.
*l6, For some discussion of ( ti" Lnc slnp; anti-Brltl h actions ! '
as Rommel appeared more certain of victory, see Jean Lacouture,




successful revolution. ' It was, in fact, less than two years later that
Nasser, as representative of the dissident elements in the Army, began
to collaborate with the Muslims in order to coordinate their common
efforts to thwart the British and establish real Egyptian independence.
The real importance of the events of 19^2, however, appears to be
in the damage they were to the Wafd. The Wafd, in their eagerness for
political power, had permitted themselves to be the object which was
forced upon the Egyptian people by British bayonets. The Wafd thus lost
an irreplaceable portion of their identification with pure Nationalism
in the minds of the Egyptian people. ' Their giving up of this position
thus permitted other groups to appropriate "some of the center." And,
perhaps even more importantly, the diminishment of the Wafd, the feeling
that "The Wafd was no longer the Delegation representing the unanimous
will of the nation. It was now nothing more than a political party,"-'
permitted the increased identification of the Brotherhood as the most
'-(•7. See Gamal Abdel Nasser. The Philosophy of the Revolution . (Buffalo:
Smith, Keyes & Marshall, 1959), p. 2^, and Anwar El Sadat. Revolt on
the Nile
.
(New York: The John Day Company, 1957), p. 22. S. E, Finer.
The Kan on Horseback . (New York: Praeger, I962), p. 65, sees "the
British coup de force against the king in 19^2" as half of the essential
wounding of the army's pride (the other being their failure in 19^8
against the Jews) which was necessary to build "a disposition to inter-
vene" mood in the army. The extent of the pro-Axis sympathy in Egypt L:
difficult to exaggerate. Perhaps the best historic example of this
attitude is the assassination of the Egyptian Prime Minister in the
Parliament when he had the "audacity" to declare war on the Axis powers
in February 19^5.
'|2. Mitchell, op_. cit
.
. np. 2'4-ff, discusses Sadat and other's coopera-
tion and coordination with the Wafd. On page 07, ho details simll
direct discussions between Nasser and the Brotherhood,
'i°. Lacouture, Trans It ion , op . cit . , pp, 97-1 0^. In a later boi
( llnssnr , op . nit .) Lacouture terms 19^2 as "a doubly lmportanl
the army, animated so far by essenl Lally corpo Lf not conserve '
!
ambitions, awoke to national conscJ ; and the Wafd war, ruined
the incarnation of the national Lons," p. hi.




legitimate actor which had not been tarnished by participation in non-
nationalistic policies. •* Furthermore, the Wafd may have been better
able to resist the attacks of the Free Officers in the 50s if the Wafd
had not so damaged itself by its support of the West during the war
years.
It was also during the war years that the Palace took a renewed
interest in politics, an interest which would remain through the rest of
the forties, and which must identify the palace as another of the polit-
ical actors/parties/pressure groups on the Egyptian political scene.
One significance of the palace as a political group is that is was the
only t>ower (acting through the King's constitutional right to dismiss
the Prime Minister) which would keen the Wafd out of power (by not
accepting the Wafdists and encouraging the coalition of splinter parties).
The success of the nalace in excluding the Wafdists from power beginning
in 19^'-l" until the general election of 1950 resulted in two primary
effects; the political instability of a minority government encouraged
even more dissidence than that which had produced a new government an
average of every eighteen months since the enactment of the constitu-
tion, 52 secondly, in the desire of the palace for power, the palace
succeeded in entangling the King in the same tarbaby with which the W,-i fd
had sat down. This is, despite the King's hatred, of the British, by
51 • "With the end of the war, the Wafd's haste to establish leaden :
in the national movement was in part an attempt to alter its image of
collaboration with the British. It was also partly due to traditional
Wafdist enthusiasm when out of power; but especially to the challenj
flung at the Wafd by the Muslim Brothers. That group had seriously
eaten into traditional Wafdist strongholds: bhe university, the < i>
service, and the countryside; and their new prestige and power boded HI




52. Actually that is a 1923 to 1 95:-' average, Gee John S. Badeau,
"
Role In Search of a Hero," Mldd Le st Journal . (Autumn, t955i No.
np. 373-3»0, P- 377.

permitting palace governments which favored close collaboration with the
British, whether necessary or not, to rule, the King lost his identifi-
cation with nationalism and therefore lost his political legitimacy.
As the war served to loosen the identification of the King and the
Wafd with Nationalism, and thus served to divorce them from the main-
stream of Egyptian political thought, there was opened an excellent
opportunity for the development of new political movements which could
take advantage of this opening. The Brotherhood (or Al-Banna) became
convinced of the need (and the opportunity) of the Brotherhood to become
politicalized. In what proved to be either a fortunate set of circum-
stances, or else demonstrated the General Guide's "feel" of the pulse
of the time, the Brotherhood was "bought-off" by the Wafd and "held-off"
by the palace, so that they were not permitted to join either the govern-
ment or the Chamber of Deputies. 53 While the Wafd and palace were
unwilling to be forced into a position of politically competing with the
well-organized and powerful Brotherhood for the nationalistic vote, the
result was that the Brotherhood was the only major political movement
that managed to escape political identification with the British during
the turmoil of the war years.
The Moslem Brotherhood had not lost its desire to begin contributing
to the political process, however, and in 19^-6 they adopted a public
platform of their goals. Of major interest in the platform were the
calls for abrogation of the Canal treaty of 193^, for removal of all
British (and other foreigners) from the country, for a refusal to nego-
tiate any new treaty with the British for the use of the Canal (the
53. See Heyworth-Dunne, op. cit . , p. 40, for description of events in
1942, see Mitchell, op. cVt.
,
p. 33, for comments on this and the 1^5




Brotherhood was now wavering being advocating internationalization and
nationalization and for the elimination of all political parties. The
reasoning involved in the latter principal is perhaps not patently
obvious, particularly in retrospect, -5 but it is explained by Husanini:
"among their political principles was the abolition
of all Egyptian political parties. They held that
these parties were brought into existence by parti-
cular circumstances and motives which were, for the
most part, personal, and not for the general good.,..
They are all alike.
. .their greediness to take over
the government. .. .party politics spoil all aspects
of the life of the people, ., .The effective cure... is




It is also noteworthy that the Brotherhood did not consider themselves
to be a political party, and the public did not so identify them.
By 19^6 the Moslem Brotherhood was able to present tangible evidence
of their dedication to social reform, for they had an operating system
of industries which used Egyptian management and labor, and in which each
worker had a share of the profits from the capital investment. ^ Within
the course of the following year the Brotherhood was able to present
their own program of land reform, a program which argued against absentee
ownership and large acreage farms, in addition to calling for the distri-
bution of public lands. The impact of this position upon the country
5'*-. In 1Q52 the Brotherhood and Nasser combined to insist on this
initial step in political reform (Mitchell, op. cit.
,
p. UO), As will
be related, this elimination of political opposition proved to be much
mnre to Nasser's advantage than to the Brother! I's.
55. Husanini, op. cit . . p. 66, For additional d »tions or
hood social reform goals, see Mitchell, or>. cit .. p. 272ff,
56, See Husanini, op_. c 1 t
.
. p. 56 1 and also Harris, op.. c\.t . , p. i ' .

perhaps can be assessed by noting the great lengths that the (palace)
government went to provide a counterbalancing "religious" opinion. -"
Postwar Egypt was a sea of discontent. The political parties (the
palace, the Wafd and the Brotherhood) were either trying to make up for
their past errors (consorting with the British during the war in the case
of the first two) or trying to consolidate their gains. The war had
greatly disrupted the cotton market (permanently it would turn out).
The budget, and the balance between imports and exports were nothing
less than chaotic. -* The cost of living was spiraling along with the
numbers of unemployed, -?" and the Army had been humiliated (asain, remem-
bering 10^2) by their performance against the Jews. In January 19^8,
Adrian Daninois had presented a plan for the High Dam, but his plan for
the development "entirely in Egypt and under Fgp^t's full sovereignty"
of the total Nile basin waters was lost in the general confusion. As
the level of terrorism increased the palace used the opportunity to
dissolve the Brotherhood. This led directly to the assassination of the
57. Heyworth-Dunne, pp. 51 an(A 9^. Al-Banna proposed "that the indi-
vidual should own as much land as he can cultivate, and that the residue
should be given to the landless, free of charge."
58. Charles Issawi, Egypt in Revolution . (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1 ^3)» P« 52, contains this specific assessment.
5°. Wilton Wynn. Nasser of Egypt
. (Cambridge: Arlington Books, l n5'')f
p. 38, describes the Egyptian economic situation during the post-war
period. This book, along with Wheelock's, op. cit
.
, are probably the
two most critical analyses of the early Nasser regime. By critical, [
do not necessarily mean biased, but most of the authors start with I e
assumption that Nasser was a combination of the Savior and Richard the
Lion-Hearted. These two authors are in favor of Nasser's actions in
general, but are willing to discuss some of th<-> less "ideal" events t
60, * Tom Little. Hir^h Dam at Aswan . (New York: The John Day Com
1°^5)» P« 32« He notes that the real Importance of the Dam "lay In the
fact that it would "buy" time for development because during the f'
t^n years of construction, for the first time since the firsl
this century, Egypt would at least not get poorer in terms of agricul-
tural production." p. 3°»

Prime Minister and the counter-assassination of the General Guide. In
this general tenor of violence the palace finally decided to give up
their attempts to keep the Wafd out of power. In late 19^+9 Egypt's last
democratic election was held. The Wafd returned to power and shortly
thereafter martial law was lifted, the Brotherhood ,was again legalized,
and one million feddans of land were distributed to the fellahs. In
the general relaxed atmosphere that resulted, the Wafd extended its
power, but its members soon returned to corruptive practices. When
public disfavor mounted the Wafd Prime Minister (Nahas) sought to restore
his government to public favor by taking a popular stand on the principal
public issues. Accordingly, in October 1951, he unilaterally abrogated
the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1 936 and the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium on
the Sudan. While this announcement did generate general rejoicing and
restored his government's shaky condition, he had not succeeded in com-
pletely appropriating the "Egyptian middle-of-the-road" position. There
was still the question of whether or not he could carry out his decla-
ration, 3 By late January 1952, it was apparent that the British (now
80,000 strong in the Canal Zone) were not going anywhere right away,
and it appears that the Brotherhood, the Communists and the palace siezed
6l-« Wynn, ov. ci.t
. , pp. j6ff, for a discussion of the events of "the
last days of Kinp; Farouk." Also see Mitchell, o£. oft., pp. 58, fo]
description o^ the sa.me events from the Moslem perspective. Sen Abdel-
Malek, on. c i
t
. , p. '41, for discussion of the land distribution.
62. See Wynn, or,, clt.
,
p. 38.
6j, It is interesting to note that the General Guide (Hudaybl) demon-
strated his complete lack of political senr-o at this time by vii Ltii
the palace and letting himself bo interpreted (by a press Interview) i
nnpnorting the King and the Wafdist policies, This served bo i ken I ' e







the popular revulsion at the Dinshawai incident
6 as an opportunity to
demonstrate their strength. The method chosen resulted in the burning
of downtown Cairo (Black Saturday), an event that horror-struck most
foreign observers, hut which, in the context of Egyptian politics, had
two very important results. First, the riot was effective in demonstra
ing that the Wafd could no longer form a legitimate government. Secondly,
and perhaps more importantly, the King had to call on the army to disperse
the mob from the Palace and to restore order in the streets. The his-
torical precedent of civilian authority being forced to rely on the Army
to maintain order and thus providing the army with derivative legitimacy
seems well documented in other Middle East nations,
65 and Black Saturday
may well have nrovided the Free Officer's with the last necessary condi-
tion for a successful revolt.
Within six months the latest (and last) Egyptian political actor
had appeared on the scene—the army—in the form of the Free Officers.
On 23 July of 1952, their revolt had succeeded (one tends to include the
phrase, beyond their wildest dreams), and Egypt was presented with
another political group that had no ideology. The initial success
<''<'). The "incident" occurred during a period of increased Egyptian
rrorist attacks upon the Canal which were intended to force the
"'>
LI
acknowledge that a new treaty was desirable. Egyptian troops, who
were forbidden to be armed with anything other than staves, were ordi
ive un their arms. On the orders of their government they refui
In the resulting military confrontation, about 50 fatalities were expe-
rienced hy the Egyptian forces.
65. The best discussion of the Fallacies in the policy oT relying
armed forces as a legitimizer (thai they thus become legitime
ictors themselves in domestic politics) Is contained in J. C. Hurewitz,
Middle East Politicsj The Hllit.-.iry Dimension . (New York! Pa er,
[^•n), particularly comments on pr. 1H, 112, and [?h.
66. Neither the Wafd nnr the Brotherhood had. an ideology which was
ential to their political legitimacy.

seems to he, at least in part, due to the general feeling that, given
the conditions of civil unrest, the army's intervention might well
provide a breathing space for everyone. In the follow -through of their
revolt, the Free Officers required King Farouk to abdicate, thus removing
the source of their own frustration. ' They then began to evaluate the
situation.
Before continuing with the remainder of the chronology, I would
like to discuss a theory, or perhaps just a possibility, as to the
nature of Gamal Abdel Nasser's thought processes. It does not seem
unreasonable to co^e to the conclusion that he was a very intelligent
man, with a great deal of self-confidence, and with a great deal of
knowledge of practical politics. As at least partial proof of these
assumptions, it seems only necessary to note that Nasser produced a
67. I think one can make the case that the Kin^ was blamed by the army
for their disgrace in 19^2 (we would have rescued him if he had called
upon us), and for the 19^8 disgrace (when he permitted friends to supply
the army with defective arms and insisted on fighting even when the a.rmy
wasn't prepared to fighi). On the last point, Wheelock, op_. cit . , reports
that "Five days before the Arab armies marched into. Palestine, several
army officers, including Brigadier Mohammed Naguib, submitted a report
to Prime Minister Mahmoud Nokrashy; the report showed conclusively that
E^ypt was not prepared to fight." p. 7.
George M. Haddad, Revolutions and Military Rule in the Mi/ldlc K;..r,l.
(New York: Robert Sneller & Sons, 1^73), p. 22, indirectly supports '
view of the King's removal, as the primary goal of the revolt when he
discusses the statement Sadat made following the successful a.ctions of
?°>rd, "The statement was an apology for the military takeover
wed primarily the military motives behind the officers' action and
their concern about the army's reputation. It sroke nT the bribery,
corruption, and. p-ovnrnment instability that had a exeat Influence 'a the
army and contributed to defeat in the Palestine War."
For what Fry have been the last straw to soi"e, see ]'. J. Vatikii '
,
T'iq Egyptian Army in Politics
.
(Bloomi ngton: Indiana Universitj I n ,
I
,v l), "n. 66, as he describes event 1"- o r 2? July 1°52, when the Kin
"insisted on appointing his brother-in-law, Colonel [small Sherine, as
Minister of War, a choi.cn hardly acce table lo the army office] .
rine's 'honorary' rank had boon bestowed on him when he marri'
Fnwr.ia, one of the King':- sisti rs, I never attei Led thi K11H
' y, and ho had no known qua! iflcations for the appointmeni
11 in his relation to the m"narchy. This open affront to '<
the Free Officers to action on July 23."

successful conspiracy by melding in diverse elements, and by patient
/TO
building (and adapting) for several years. It also seems at least not
unreasonable to propose that his personal proclivity for conspiracy was
simply his own method of exercising political action. ° At the same
time, I propose that the description of Nasser as purely a "reactive"
individual is very misleading and was adopted by many observers in order
to both escape the necessity for assessing Nasser with any responsibility
for the excesses or ill effects of his actions (if he is just reacting,
all the blame can be placed upon his opponents), and similarly can
escape the (normal) necessity of explaining Nasser's intentions. When
there is an individual with the intelligence and political sense to rise
to the ton of an organization of men who were interested in nower, and
then, against all opposition, for almost two decades, in the midst of
68, Wynn, op . cit . , p. 32, "In developing the Free Officers Committee,
Nasser displayed remarkable conspira.torial skill. He refused to allow
minor doctrinal differences to hamper the movement, and it was his
patience and restraint which prevented his young colleagues from making
a disasterous premature bid for power, Nasser pulled together young
officers who represented a wide range of political ideology..."
This description of Nasser is rather typical and others of the same
ilk are easily found.
69, For example, the security system reported by Wynn, c_n. c i + . , n. 62,
"In addition to the normal intelligence services of the army and Ministry
or Interior, Nasser has a General Intelligence Administration answerable
directly to him. Within his adnrni strati on are four separate systems,
no one of which has any contact with the other. They report directly to
Nasser and hence act as a check on one another."
In the same vein, a comment which indicates both Nasser's conspir-
atorial bent and the violence in Egyptian politics, is in St. John, op ,
cit
. .
p. 199, "( rf)he reporters discovered that Nasser was the best-
guarded man in Bandung: he had brought eight personal bodyguards with
him to supplement the whi te-helrnetted Indonesian troops..."
70, This acceptance by many sophisticated reporters of Nasser's poor-
mouthing of himself as only a "reacting" individual should be re1
in history as one of the great put-ons of all time. At th time,
this concept provided a good way of rationalizing that all bad events in
the Kiddle East were the fault of the Kest, and supplied an Intellec-
tual(l?) reason for rooting for the underdog.

the most unstable social conditions which Egypt had ever seen, could
maintain himself as the leader until he died in bed, it does not seem
consistent to maintain that this was not a planning and calculating
individual. ' l
There is another alternative that should be considered. Is it
i
unreasonable to expect that Nasser was an aware viewer of the Egyptian
political scene? As I hope to have already made clear, there were
specific political issues of Egyptian politics that were basic to the
educated individual's daily life. Therefore, given Nasser's personal
view that the future of social reform in Egypt depended upon the Free
Officers* continuation in power, does it seem unreasonable to suppose
that, while he may not have publically (or privately) verbalized his
thought processes, he nevertheless considered, evaluated and acted in a
political manner that was necessary to maintain his regime (and himself)
in power? I do not think this is unreasonable nor do I know of any
information in the public domain which tends to refute this proposition.
Given the conclusion that one of the primary considerations involved
in Nasser's decisions was how to best maintain the power position of the
Free Officers, the events from 1952 to 195^ appear rather consistent.
As an overall view, it appears evident that Na.sser had several political
opponents. There were at least four traditional political forces in the
country (the Wafd, the Brotherhood, the Communists and bhe Palace, not
71. Lacouture, Transit' on
, on . cit . , p. ^^, describes Nasser as
"extremely intelligent.
.
.we should recall,., the cunning with which he
constantly played off Nahir against F.irouk, hamstrung the Wafd, set
Moslem Brotherhood factions at each others' throats, not to mention ' he
various brands of communism. .. .No doubt all this can bo put down to
calculation."
Also note a particularly significant quote that Lacouture ( Nasi
op
. cit .. p. 36l) records Nasser as remarking to a Western journalii
,
"I shall tell you something which I have drawn from my own experience)
at the summit, there is a perpetual struggle for power,"

even considering the large landowners and the foreign interests), and
72
Nasser himself had created another—the army.' Basic political strategy
called for the neutralization of his political opponents and the estab-
lishment of a base of support which was loyal only to him. In retro-
spect, it seems obvious that Nasser used the tried and true techniques
of appropriating the popular aspects of his opponents platform (which
was facilitated by the fact that he had no stated ideology which might
become contradicted), dividing his opponents by temporarily allying
himself with first one and then another, while constantly working to
undermine one's (non-allied) opponents. Continual patient repeating of
this cycle tears at the fabric of the other's organization, while your
own organization can. be built up and developer! owinr; nothing to any of
the rormer organizations. The process appears to require a strong,
authoritarian hand at the controls, a man with definite organizational/
political goals (if only' goals towards maintaining power), a man like
Nasser.
In August, the Free Officer^ bepran calling for party reformation.
As resistance to this anti-Wafd maneuver began to solidify, in early
September Nasser removed the Wafdist cabinet (arresting nearly fifty
supporters) and installed (ex) General Neguib as Prime Minister with his
Minister of the Interior a dedicated anti-Wafd 1st. This froital attack
'?., Although some authors note the venture of another colonel, Arabi,
into politics as a result o r his revolt of 1RB?., and regard that a a
' rerunner of the 195? revolt, most authors are more Inclined bo r<
that affair as making Nasser's job more difficult. For imnle, s
Heyworth-Dunne , op. cit. , a. 3—"His (Arabi's) badly advised mlliJ
rising did a great deal of harm to the Egyptian cause ror, ai I •
Muhammad Rifast of the Higher Training College, Cairo, state , "No hi
affliction can befall a nation than the officious meddling of Its mili-
tary authorities in national politics."
For another view, see Ahmed, o_n. cit
. , p. 53.

upon the Wafd party'-' was followed the very next day by the announcement
of the Agrarian (Land) Reform Law.' The limiting of maximum acreages
to 200 feddan (plus 50 per son for up to two sons) managed to effectively
divert attention from the army's attack upon the Wafd and Communists,
while satisfying an established social "cause." At the same time, the
action eliminated the large landholders who were much of the basis of the
political support of the Wafd and many of the other splinter political
parties in the pre-revolt days.'-5 Concurrently, land reform served to
establish the Free Officer's legitimacy (was it just happenstance that
the 200/300 feddan limi+ation fell between the Communist's proposed
limit of 100 and the Brotherhood's and Wafd's limit of 500, or was it
73. Wheelock, op_. cit . , p. 18, discusses the Wafd's recognition of the
danger of political (and. personal) extinction with which they were being
threatened
,
7'J-. See footnote #37 for references which discuss the reform.
75« "Nasser's famous Land Reform Law primarily was a politica] rati ei
than an economic reform. Tn one stroke, the law practically eliminated
the class of Eryntian landowners who so long had ruled and abused t 1
country. .. .Many have ridiculed this law. But those who did so assumed
that Na.sser had issued, the law to solve the -problem of the landle
peasantry,
. .the help they received was somewhat incidental to the main
purpose of the law, which was to destroy the power of feudalism." Wynn,
op
. cit . , p. 75. The remainder of the quoted paragraph Li Lmporl 11 I to
later considerations of the importance nf the Aswan Dam—"Leader
Revolution have never pretended that land distribution was the solution
to rural land hunger. The only remedy to that disease, they Lnsii I
, Ls
to increase the cultivated land area of Egypt."

really all Gamal Salem's computations?). 76 Moving on the heels of these
two blows, with the Wafd and their supporters in disarray, Nasser purged
the arry officer ranks of Wafdist supporters and installed military
officers as observers in the governmental offices.'' Thus by the end of
September 1952, Nasser had eliminated the Wafd and jthe Communists as
legitimate political contenders. He had struck crippling blows at their
elements of support within Egypt, and he had appropriated their primary
social reform issue—land reform.
?
8
The Brotherhood was a more difficult opponent. Before mounting the
anti-Wafd moves, Nasser had neutralized the Brotherhood by an invitation
to join the Free Officers in the Cabinet, but the General Guide had
subsequently rejected the offer and by the middle of October the Brother-
?6. Salem is fliven practically full credit by St. John, on. cit . ,
p. 151.
James B. Mayfield subtitles his Rural Pol it ins in Nasser's Wot .
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1071) as "A Quest for Le-"' ti nar-y"
and notes that "one central thpme of this study is the concept of polit-
ical legitimization, the process of inculcating and deepening the belief
among members of a society that the present political institutions,
procedures and ideals 'are right, are flood, and are appropriate." More
explicitly, one might define the process of legitimization as tl
Levelopment
. . .
of a deep and unambiguous sense of identity with the
national government— its leaders, policies, institutions, and procedun
....The violent overthrow of established values and institutions en t1
a crisis of legitimacy in which neither the old nor the new Is comnlel ily
acceptable." p. 5«
77. See Wheelock, op., cit . . p. 19.
78, Recall that the Wafd had used the distribution of land to mark (and
legitimize) their return to power in 1950 (pafle-tHiir+fHWt of thl per).

hood sympathizer had "been eradicated from the Free Officers. <° The
campaign to eliminate the Brotherhood could not be undertaken lightly,
however, and Nasser paused for a period of consolidation and flanking
attempts. In January 1953, all political parties were abolished (recall
that the Brotherhood were not a political party) and the Liberation
Rally—"the school where the people will be taught how to elect their
representatives properly"—was formed to establish a base of political
sunport for the Free Officers. While the Brotherhood perceived this
move as an attempt of Nasser to acquire legitimacy at the expense of the
Brotherhood, Nasser's continued (if only superficial) obeisance to the
Brotherhood was sufficient to limit anti-revolt action on the latter'
s
part.
In April 1953, Nasser began negotiations with the British as to the
status of the Canal (what would replace the abrogated treaty of IQ36?),
and I would suggest that he was aware that this issue was the critical
one to the survival of his regime. While the British were pressing for
a settlement and were insistent on maintaining a right of reentry to the
Zone in the event of area aggression, and Nasser was interested in
appropriating an additional section of the Egyptian political middle by
establishing his firm claim as a nationalist (the most basic political
question In Egyptian politics, as we have seen), the Brotherhood war,
7°. For the Brotherhood's reasons for not becoming part of the Frei
OfHcer's cabinet, see Mitchell, op_. c 1 1,
. , pp. 107ff. Reading of '
literature leads one to think that the Brotherhood did not regard ,;
Free Officers as real competitors on the Egyptian political scene a
undoren timatnd their power. For instance, Harri , on. c i t . , t>. 7.0? ,
notes that, "In retrospect, It is apparent that the Muslim Brotherh
misjudged the strength of the leaders of the Revolution. , .waited too
ng to offer their support..." Another view is that "the Bretln
ought a Moslem state fulfilling all precepts of Moslem law and run by
the new generation they were preparing. They did not conr.i Ler I
officers competent to carry on this task." Ilusalni, op_. fit., p. 13] .

against even the very act of negotiation. Thus while Nasser did not
feel strong enough to challenge the British while their soldiers occupied
the Canal, the Canal question had united the out-of-power parties before
(remember Black Saturday?), and Nasser knew he was going to have to
settle the question short of the absolute nationalistic goals which were
so popular in Egyptian politics. Not being able to eliminate the oppos-
ing team, Nasser was faced with eliminating the scorekeeper(s) in order
to disguise his failure. It does not seem too out of place to picture
Nasser as regarding the Canal negotiations as a ticking time bomb.
In June of 1953? Nasser felt strong enough to eliminate the nagging
irritant of the Monarchy, and thus rid himself of the "Palace" as a
legitimate narticipant in the political process, while simultaneously,
the establishment of a Republic (with the Free Officers in control) gave
Nasser's Egypt legitimacy on the international scene, a particularly
valuable commodity to have in the negotiations with the British.
The Egyptian Communist party was identified as the next weakest
political group, and by August, arrests, torture, and detention of their
members had begun. After several months of action against the Communists,
Nasser moved against the Brotherhood. In October, feeling that the
Liberation Rally had become dominated, by the Brotherhood, Nasser estab-
lished the National Guard to act as a counterweight an'! hopefully his
source of sunnort independent of the Army. This effort was foiled when





. , p, 1.71.. "(r)here was a disc]
royalist campaign being conducted in England by the former level by-
old 'Dauphin," Prince Mohamed All, who went aboul saying thai i r Faj ufc
was distasteful, not all the members of his family were without merit."
Also see St, John, 0J2« clt . . p. 15^.

joined the Rally. 81 In November, Nasser moved to put the weight of the
regime "behind one of the splinter elements of the Brotherhood to over-
throw the General Guide.
82 The ignominious failure of this scheme due
to the popular demand for Hodeiby's return as the Guide served to bring
the split between the Brotherhood and Nasser out into the open and made
open warfare practically inevitable. 83 The open break came in January,
when, using a public incident that appears to have been stager!, and
the charge (among others
)
8
^ that the Brotherhood were negotiating with
the British over the Canal behind the back of the government (a charge
that very conveniently served to minimize the Brotherhood's main charge
against Nasser), Nasser abolished the Moslem Brotherhood and arrested
more than four hundred Brethren.
00 This proved to be a tactical error,
for the Brotherhood and the Communists at last found common ground for a
policy of anti-Nasserism, and their strength was not totally illusionary.
They would seize any opportunity to retaliate upon Nasser.
81. Nasser's primary purpose in establishing the Guard may have been to
put more pressure on the British to settle the Canal issue, instead of
acting to neutralize the Brotherhood. For discussions of the reasons
for the establishment, see Husaini, pp. cit., p. 133; Mitchell, op. cit .
,
p. 112; and Wheelock, op. cit . , p. 28.
«?. See Footnote #kk and Harris, pp. cit., p. lR7ff, for descriptions
or the fractionalism which was basic bo all discussions of the Brother-
hood after the al -Banna assassination.
P3. See Wheelock, pp. cit .. p. 28, and Mitchell, pp. cit ., p. 115-
PH. When an army jeen broadcasting government propaganda lnterru '• I
Moslem ceremonies at the University of Cairo. For one description,
Mitchell, pp. pip., p. 126, for another see Harris, pp. cit . , p. !l6.
85. See Harris, pp. cit .. p. 21.7, for a summary of al] bhe govern en1 l
charges against the Brotherhood.
86, For the explanation that Nasser had started propaganda bo Identify
the regime with religion all the way back \n April, and had been anxioui
to destroy the Brotherhood earlier, but couldn't convince the resi of
the Free Officers at that time, see Wheelock, pp. cit . , p, 28.

In the still fluid caldron of Egyptian politics, the item in most
ample supply was provocation and situational opportunity. Within six
weeks, disagreements within the Free Officers resulted in General Neguib's
bloodless coup. Nasser's worst fears had been realized. The army
support, his only claim to legitimate rule, had disintegrated before he
was able to build up another prop. In addition, Nasser had not yet
completed the destruction of the other Egyptian political parties (not
a]l levels of the frovernment had yet been purged of their sympathizers).
Thus there were civilian structures readily available with already
established cadres who were only too anxious to arrange for the organi-
zation of demonstrations against the regime. The Brotherhood, the Wafd
and the Communists seized upon the occasion offered by the military
disarray to vocalize their complaints against Nasser, Neguib's coup
was a complete success.
Unfortunately for Neguib (and his temporary allies), they did not
possess the political or conspiratory talents of Nasser. Nasser, although
shaken by the realization of his worst fears, immediately began working
to form a coalition of forces. 88 He was permitted to retain the Prime
Ministry for two weeks, an^ he used the time wisely, moving to transfer
the army (and Free) officers who had shown their "true" colors. Con-
currently, he revamped the cabinet to gain control of the trade unions,
87. While Nasser was certainly interested Inter in proving a rel ' n
ship between NeguVb and the Brotherhood , it appears more ls Lf -ill of
Nasser's enemies seized the opportunity of the other's ire to .nlly them-
selves in an informal (non-conspirator) relationship.
88. See Wynn, op,, ell,
,
p. lOOff and Little, Er.ypt . op., clt . , , 3^.

while trusted army officers were infiltrated and integrated into the





found an independent" "base for support. '
After he was forced to give up the posts of Prime Minister and.
President of the RGG, Nasser turned his efforts to .making peace with the
Brotherhood, an effort that proved that the Brotherhood (or at least the
General Guide), was easy prey. This peace-making also effectively split
the Communists from the Brotherhood, for by organizing the selective
relegalization of the Brotherhood and not the Communists, the latter
wer° effectively isolated. Concurrently, Nasser refocused his not
inconsiderable charismatic skills back upon the army,' and succeeded in
cutting Neguib (who was really the "reactor") away from the only base of
his own support.
Within four weeks Nasser was ready. His counter-coup was well-
orchestrated, brilliantly conceived, and completely effective. With
the Brotherhood largely neutralized and the labor unions organized, the
streets of Cairo belonged to Nasser. With the opposition either con-
verted or eliminated from the barracks, so did the army.
Nasser had lost ground in his drive to eliminate the Brotherhood,
but he had pureed the army and solidified his hold, there for a while.
fin
.
See St. John, op . cit . , p. 172; Wynn, o_p. cit





. . p, 1 86 ; or Wheelock, ov. c 1
1
. , p. JH-, At the same
time, Wheelock presents an interesting point on p. 72 which may ex] I 'in
some of the problems 'Nasser has had in developing a political ba e,
Perhaps he subconsciously "fears the development of a political force
which ultimately might challenge his authority."
90. "Nasser sought only bo gather the army around h:im by playinp on
sort of class consciousness and flattering the officers' corporatisl
Lrit. What were you before? Nothing. What have you become, whal
could you become again? Everything. Do you wish to fall back into the
shame of the past, ill-commanded, ill-paid, forgotten, despised?"
Lacouture, Nasser
, op . cit ., p. 13^'.

The closeness of the affair must have had an effect, for while Nasser
continued his harassment of the Brotherhood, no overt attempt was made
to physically eliminate IJ ., despite the ever nearer date of agreement
on the Canal. One feasible explanation for this may he that Nasser
adopted a change of tactics. With the weakness of the Moslem Brotherhood
leadership," perhaps it was possible to peacefully appropriate the
political issues for which the Brotherhood stood (with the obvious
exception of the "no negotiations" one). Accordingly, Nasser made the
92
Pilfrrimas-e in August and attended a meeting of Muslim leaders in Mecca. 7 '
His hopes of appeasement- were in vain. The "heads of agreement" state-
ment on the Canal ha.d been floated on 27 July to test the water, anri the
Brotherhood had reacted £3 K&<& \o*&x\ ex'^f^ecL . The battle was joined,
Nasser reacted by giving the secret police full freedom, from
censorship of sermons,'-' to fabrication of press stories, arrests on all
pretenses, and the loosening of the National Guard onto the mosques.
The Brotherhood reacted by moving to coordinate with the remnants of the
Wafd and the Communists. Before the announcement on 19 October of the
91. The General Guide /was so anx'ous not to provide Nasser with a
nrovacatory incident that he had left the country and either remained
out or stayed in hidinr for the critical months of the Autumn,
92. See Mitchell, op_. cit
.
. pp. 137 and 1^3.
°°i. Al-Banna had earlier learned the effectiveness of lecturing from
the pulpit. The success of their tactics would seem to, attribute
validity to the concent that "the Fellahin can be induced to act, bo
revolt, and to destroy when their struggle is equated with a ,-iihad (holy
war). Motivation stfll seems to bo dressed in religious ^arb and u
participation appears to require a foreign infide] (hon-Muslim) i n<
yfield, on . cit.
, p.
r
^. Nassi ' a1 b ck on the Brotherhood'
bhe tactic received worldwide attention (throurh Time magazine re orl I,
Mitchel, op_. cit
. i p. I'j-0. Nasser has himself exproprial d bhj
nique. "The Friday Sermon, a braditional institution whether in r
or on the r;idlo, has become since 1955 a didactic bed n' u I a





signing of the new Canal agreement, Nasser's penetration into the Brother-
hood (in which he was trying to use the same technique (that had pre-
viously failed) of supporting one group against the General Guide) }
succeeded in throwing the Brotherhood into internal confusion and resulted
in the complete splintering of the Brethren into at, least three separate
oh,
groups, y
While Nasser had succeeded by his splintering tactics in preventing
the Brotherhood from "striking while the iron was hot" with respect to
the fire of the Canal agreement, he had also removed the restraining
control of the General Guide -from -the Brotherhood, and a week after the
announcement of the Treaty, the famous assassination attempt was made-, '
Nasser quickly called on the transport union for street support, the
security police for their normal best efforts, and then moved ruthlessly
to at last crush this final competing political actor.-'
Nasser was now in the position to appropriate the entire Egyptian
political middle. He had already seized the issue of land reform. He
had at least won some laurels (as a nationalist) with respect to the
Canal, Now was the opportunity to seize the nan-Moslom/Arab mantle as we]].
Oil. See Mitchell, on. clt
., p. t^Rrr, for the bent discussion of l,M
period.
n(5. Only a note on the accuracy of reported history. Although the
event was witnessed by many reporters, broadcast nationwide, rn : rec ,
it is difficult to find two writers who even closely agree as bo ''''" r




^>. The trials, etc., are covered in Mitchell, o_m. ell. ., p. L51 'T.
resurgence capability of the Brotherhood (demonstrating their i
ideological appeal) is seen by the fact that Nasser Felt Lt neci try t<
ieatedly purge the Brotherhood in or''or to control it. Fo] Ip-
tion of some of Nasser's continued trobleir.s with the
after I he massive purgos of i95^"5i see Blie i ourie, "Anti-1
Egypt," M. Con fl no, ojQ. cit
. ,
pv- 321 -333 •

No sooner must the opportunity have been recognized (the Brother-
hood trials were completed in February 1955) i then the Baghdad Pact (by
allying Iraq with the West) blatantly put the lie to Nasser's claim to
Q7
be able to rally the Arab Middle East in a pan-anything movement.''' On
top of this domestic setback, Israel's demonstration of the military
capability to operate unchecked against Egyptian "strongpoints" served
qo
to rekindle discontentment in the army.' The Bandung conference offered
the first opportunity to regain the lost ground.
It seems appropriate to recall at this point in history, when it
appeared that Nasser had successfully withstood the challenges of all
the opnosing facets of Egyptian politics, that Nasser still had not
caught the spirit of Egyptian popular nationalism—the anti-West, no-
compromise spirit that had sustained the Brotherhood movement (and the
sympathys of the citizenry) throughout an extended period of unrelenting
opposition and persecution. Thus, until Nasser succeeded in widening
his own political base, while there was not any large amount of organized
opposition (after 195^0 against him, there did not have to be a large-
scale effort to be dangerous to him. A revolt on the order of the one
97, "The Nasser movement. . .aspired to create a strong and independent
Egypt that would lend to the renaissance of the Arab world and eventually
of Islam; it f"rmTy believed that the emancipation of the whole region
from Western dominance was the first task and that the Baghdad Pact
n retrogressive step,.," Tom Little, Egynt . (New York: Praeger. I r,r. p ~),
n. 261.
For another comment which recognizes that Nasser's foreign i.nt' n I
were guided by domestic concerns—"From 195'J' through the end of the Su
Crisis.
.
.Nasser was primarily concerned with the domestic security 1 '
his regime of modern-revolution. If he were to hold power and I ve tl
support of the more radical military, he had to avoid political and
milii try entanglements with the West..." Leonard Binder, The Idep]
Revolution in the Kiddle East
.
(New York: John Wiley, I u'h), p, 2j6\
98. "The Gaza attacks led to the one tl Lng Nasser always had feared
most—trouble inside his army. Recalling the fate of King Faron
, my
officers frankly threatened an anti-Nasser coup unless sufficJ
were forthcoming to cope with Israel." Wynn, 00. cit , . p, It 6.

of 1952 would probably have been sufficient to remove the Free Of fleers
just as easily as they had the King. Nasser's continued unpopularity
with the people (read as "continued failure to obtain political legit-
imacy") is striking throughout the 1952-56 era.. As an exa.mple of the
tenor of the reports, one recalls Wheelock's description of Nasser's
drive to the sight of his "Army Day" (Canal nationalization) speech--"a
small mongrel dog, running bewilderedly beside his large limousine,
received, more apnla.use from the crowd than did he."^ If Nasser had
failed to establish no more enthusiasm than this in more than two years
of negligible opposition and absolute censorship, does one think that
those two years were easy?
The answer is no. While the subduing of the political opposition
had proven feasible, their replacement was much more difficult because
the regime was not only responsible for what they said /promised, they
were also responsible to the people for events. The Brotherhood had
been able to avoid that responsibility (of failure) by remaining out of
the government. Nasser was not able to adopt that tactic. Thus, while
the Bandung conference enabled Nasser to appear as a true neutralist
(and, even better, with nerhaps Eastern leanings) in this first Asian •
African conference, and the result in E.fynt was encouraging, the
anticipated failures in the Sudan which became evident in the late
summer were much more serious. The Sudan issue and the Canal issue I d
9°. Wheelock, op. cit
. ,
p. 57.
100. The basis for the Egyptian hatred of the West is ingrained in the
historic East-West conflict which took place in the Middle East, and
basic religious reasons detailed previously. In addition, Is 11
charge of Western imperialism and another aspect detailed by Heji 1 1
Dunne, cm. cit
., p. v. "There is a natura] dislike of the Wesl
the Arabic Press, controlled by capitalists, politicians, and
Interests, tends to blame the West for all the difficulties and rob]
of modern life in order to remove the onus from themselves f "

been historically linked in Egyptian minds and a perceived loss (to
the British) in the Sudan more than negated any perceived gain with
respect to the Canal. Can one postulate that Nasser, when considering
how best to counter the serious loss of domestic political power due to
Western sponsored setbacks in the Arab world (the Baghdad pact primarily,
but also the Gaza Raid), and setbacks in Egypt's "own territory" (Sudan),
was convinced of the necessity for dramatically demonstrating his inde-
pendence from and disregard of, Western policy, Did not this motivation
have a strong voice in his decision to seek (in May) and accept (in
September) non-Western (Russian) arms?
It seems at least possible that the answer to this question is yes.
It also seems definite that the results were electrifyingly successful
1 02in accomplishing these ends, no matter what the intentions were. In
addition, this explanation, (with emphasis on the practical demonstration
to Nasser of the political rewards ripe for reaping by anyone willing to
tweak the West's nose), provides apparent insight into Nasser's reasons
101. Tom Little ( Nasser , op . cit . , p. 238) notes that Nasser's decision
to abandon Egypt's claim to the Sudan in order to gain the \95li treaty
with England "was a courageous decision, for the people o r Egypt had
been taught by decades of propaganda to believe that 'unity of the Nile
valley' was a, fact welcomed, by the Sudanese themselves,"
For another discussion of how critical the Sudanese issue was to
Egyptian internal politics, see Humphrey Trevelyan, The Middle East in
Revolution
.
(Boston: Gambit, 1Q?0), Chanter 2.
1^2. "Nasser now carried the crowd with him. He had touched a deep
chord, in the Egyptian masses, in their disl'ke of the Wont.... We mui
not forget that the Colonel did not invent this solution, but was only
carrying out what the Wafd had already thought of doing -, n 1 °'H , M|
that two days before the burning of Cairo, on the 2k I h of January I '''..',
the newspaper Ahram announced that yp1 was going to try to buy ar
from Moscow." Lacouture,
'
Transit ion , op . cit
. . p. 22 7 .
For a more detailed description of the reaction of the streel
crowds, see Wynn, op. cit . . p. 120.
Cremeans says flatly "Na ler's foreign policy became particularly
popular with the Egyptian massi only when he started attackli
West." Charles D, Cremeanr;, The Ar Lbs a.rd My World
. (New Korki
Praeger, 19*3). V- 300.

for the recognition of Red China in May 1956. The latter event is
particularly significant "because so many observers have found difficulty
in attempting to explain why Nasser conducted this particular act in the
face of its almost certain ramifications with respect to American Con-
1 0?gressional consideration of the High Dam aid, J
With the. setback in the Sudan and in the Muslim world, it is of
interest to evaluate the success of the "revolution" in other areas.
Nasser's first and most popular effort (prior to the arms deal with the
East) was his land reform measure. But as we have noted before, these
measures were not suitable or intended to be of real economic benefit to
the country. Additionally, there were only so many royal and confis-
cated feddans to give away. By 195^» the end was in sight. The Agrarian
Reform officials no longer released figures on the amount of land which
had been given away to the landless, the Liberation Province project was
moving much more slowly than anticipated (and would shortly prove to be
a scandalous public failure resulting in another political crisis for
Nasser), and other land reclamation projects were doing at least as
poorly. -> In 195^, "the Hi/rh Dam project was the only land reform pro-
ject that still possessed political credibility and promise. Nasser
implicitly had recognized this as early as Ja.nuary 1P55» when he person-
ally (and publically) discussed the High Ua.m as "the principal project"
103. For a British view of the exhreme counterproductiveness of LM
decision, see Trevelyan, or>. c i 1.
. , p. yi
.




. , p. 80ff for an analysis of bhe situation after 195^-
105. Wheelock, 0£, cit .. p. 9^ff and Issawi, o£. cit .. p. I 31 Tf
,

in her "clear-cut policy for rebuilding the country on new foundations."
Ground had been broken in June of the previous year. The most prominent '
and successful demonstration of Nasser's social reform was well on track,
Pne can picture Nasser regarding the summer of 195& as the period
of consolidation of his political position in Egyptj. He vras finally
going to achieve political legitimacy. The first general election
(referendum since Nasser was the only candidate) since 19^9 wa s going to
be held in Egypt in June 1 95^ • Not purely by chance, the Canal agreement
of 195^ called for the last British troops to be out of the zone five
days before the election. Thus Nasser was seizing the moment in which
he could most validly claim credit for furtherance of the Nationalistic
(anti-British) political goals, as the best moment in which to call for
legitimizing elections. Does it seem too remote to suppose that his May
recognition of Red China, another tangible demonstration of his freedom
from (and disregard for) western policy, vras not part of the same "stretch
drive" effort to increase his popularity within the country?
On 23 June 1956, Gamal Abdel Nasser was elected President of Egypt
for six years and his Constitution was approved. Nasser received 99t9
per cent of the vote.
What was the effect of the American and British 2o July refusal to
fund the Dam upon this carefully wrought condition of political acce]
'
106. .Gamal Abdel Nasser, "The Egyptian Revolution," Kan, ::i ai..-, ;>>.]
Society in the Contemporary Mir"1 ' 1 !" X.'i-.t
. Jacob M, Landau ( ed
. ) (New
York: Traegerj 1.^72), p. h?.. This is a reprint of an article that
appeared in Foreign Affairs in January 1955*
107. "(D)ragomen conducting tourists ua the Nile pointed to an emphatic
white line drawn vertically on each bank of the river at the Asu
cataract, remarking that a mountain of a dam would r.oon be buiH h
Nasser had ordered the painting of these linos so that popular !






Let me review the situation. There were two critical aspects of Egyptian
politics. The first and most important was nationalism. Political national-
ism renuired an anti-West foreign policy, both as an extension of the
Middle East's age old history of East-West conflict, as a reflection of
the desire of the Muslim world to regain their position of ascendency
over the West, and as a reaction to the recent history of Western (French
and British) hedgemony and imperialism in Egypt. Nasser had moverl to
capture this feeling by succeeding in gaining the removal of British
troops from Egyptian soil, but had been forced to accept the presence of
British technicians and the right of the British to reenter the area.
That, had been at best only a partial victory, and Nasser's failure to
achieve total victory had nearly cost him his regime. In partial com-
pensation, Nasser had moved, to establish his freedom from Western influence
in the field of foreign affairs, and. after some initial setbacks, had
made great strides in that area. Unfortunately, Nasser had played
nearly all his "foreign policy cards" due to the necessity to counter
the Sudan setback and to achieve convincing popular election results.
The second critical aspect of Egyptian politics was land reform.
If the purpose of the revolution was social reform, and if social reform
consisted of land reclamation and distribution, and if there were no
longer the promise of further land reclamation and distribution—wh
was the need of the revolution? Land reform was the initial and moi ]
stable foundation of political support for the Free Officers, If thl
foundation were to crumble, could the revolution be shored ur>?
My impression is that Nasser understood the situation as H Is
presented here. Perhaps not in those cold words, but in thi emotii i
and practical political facts that would produce the same ends. Gi' •
this problem, I feel he made an evaluation similar to the followin .

The regime cannot survive the disappointment of an obvious failure and
halt in the land reform program. The only available monies (which are
not already morgaged for arms) are those of the Canal revenues. There
is no additional action that can be taken to further align Egypt with
the East which is feasible to accomplish in a shorty period, -*- uo and it is
1 0°
necessary to rea.ct now to this attack upon my political legitimacy.
The only feasible action I can take is to nationalize the Canal, both
110for its revenues, and, equally important, to maintain my newly-acquired
political legitimacy.
108. The evidence indicates that Russia was not prepared to fund the
Dam at this point. In addition, Egypt had already shifted her arms
purchases to the East and recognized Red China. Besides all this, the
Eastern Bloc had more Egyptian cotton than they could use,
109. Probably one of the more telling conversations is the one reported
by Heikal when he relates how Nasser found out about the withdrawal o f
American aid for the Dam. As Nasser and Nehru flew into Cairo, "Nasser's
Air Force aid e -de-camn ca.me back from the cockpit with a radio message.
It was a resume of Dulles' statement. The President read it, excusi
himself to Nehru without telling him what was in the message, then
hrourht it back to show Dr. Fawzi and myself.
"Th's is not a withdrawal," he said, "It is an attack on the
regime and an invitation to the people of Egypt to bring it down," (op.
cU„ p. 68).
110. A proposition which is not completely invalid on the surface, for
a I i hou":h the Canal revenues could never pay for the Aswan Dam ai p] i ined,
they could pay. for a lesser dam, or could, pay part of the costs of a
.longer term plan, or charges could be raised, or maybe Nasser didn'1
really know what the realized fiscal .-..mount from the Canal woul ' be,
is implied by his speech. (When he said, "The Cana] wil]
|
i; f<
!" as reported In Heikal, ag, cit
. . p, 170.). One thing foi sun
,
any additional foreign exchange could he nut to good use consider Li
pt*S fiscal situation. "During the first seven months of L 95 ,
Egypt's national debt rose by almost a third—from 218.6 to 280,3 .




Given my description of events in Egypt from a.bout 1919 to mid-195"i
it seems feasible to draw some conclusions. The first is that Nasser
did not spring from the Egyptian mass with unique and n^w ideological
views, but that conclusion is rather moot since only the most biased (or
indiscriminatory) authors leave such an impression t| The second, con-
clusion is that it seems possible to draw at least a. tentative inference
that practically all of Nasser's actions within his first four years of
power were primarily the result of the bureaucratic pressures of Egyptian
politics and society. It seems possible to picture Nasser, for the
first two years of his regime, as working against an impending deadline
—
the point at which he could no longer stall the British and (more impor-
tantly) the Egyptian public—the point at which he had to produce an
alternative to the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. Since Nasser knew
that any (internationally) feasible alternative was bound to be disap-
proved, by the corporate political bodies, and would serve them as a
unifying theme, to the ultimate determent of Nasser's own political
ambitions, it was necessary for Nasser' to either destroy or neutralise
all Egyptian political parties before reaching agreement on the Can '.
To accomplish this goa.l, it was necessary for Nasser to apnropria to th<
middle ground of nationalism, social reform, pan-Arabism, etc., froj tl
existing political groups. Thus Nasser's ideology developed From the
Ideology of h's strongest political competitors which in most cases rere
the Muslim Brotherhood.
Similarly, an examination of the period of 195^ to mid-1956 su
that it is possible to completely avoid the question of whether Nai
111. One interesting result, of this paper was thai r developed i v •'.
different chronology than did Kenneth Lovo. I submit thai bhi
primarily because of the difference in our mnr,!-'- ra1 Ion of maci
—
mlcrointernational theory versus EgyT)bian-mlcrotheory«

did or did not use "foreign adventures" to distract the people from
domestic failures, for the "foreign policy" questions as to the status
of the Canal, the Dam and the Arab' Islamic movement were in fact critical
aspects of Egyptian domestic politics.
In summation, it seems feasible to postulate t|hat in addition to
the macrotheoredical and the microtheoredical explanation of the causes
of the Suez Crisis of 195^, ther° is a great deal of room for a combina-
tion bureaucratic-organizational model that just deals with Egyptian
internal politics, and results in at least a facile explanation of
events. This theory would approach Nasser as a product of the social
forces of the Egyptian times. It would postulate that Nasser was murh
more a prisoner of those forces than he was an original actor on the
international scene whose ideals and actions were viewed with awe by his
fellow citizens. This explanation would lean heavily upon the historic
development of the Egyptian political ideology and would picture Nasser
as a leader who was racing to establish his own political legitimacy
before he was deposed by the very same disruntive forces which had
enabled tvm to initially rise to pnwr. The explanation might conclude
bhat the Nationalization of the Cannl
,
(i would suggest that whether or
not that was the cause of the Suez Crisis is more apnropriately a ques-
tion for evaluation in the context of British and French, bu'l particu-
larly Israeli bureaucratic politics) was inevitable, no matter what fl
actions wer^ of the United States with respect to the Dam aid, A r r '.->'-r-
vntion to this last conclusion would bo that it appears that the United
States decision on the Dnm made the nationalization inevitable a1 tl
particular time period. The Interesting point that can he d:
the "common" conclusion of the man in the street, that NasGer nation-
alized the Canal because of United States refusa] bo support bl 1 . >

correct. One wonders, however, if it is not correct for the wrong
reasons, and whether or not this might not be a common occurance in the
field of foreign policy.
In addition to the conclusions which can be dr,awn directly from
this examination of this critical era. in Egyptian politics, there are
two more which are suggested by my readings in this area. The first is,
with respect to Dulles' reported hesitancy about supplying the Dam aid
due to the necessity to continue harmonious relations with Egypt for a
period of at least ten years, and the unlikelihood of that close (and
the inevitable and perhaps necessary superior actor position of the
United States as the supplier of funds) relationship producing anything
but resentment on the part of the Egyptians. If that interpretation
of his position is correct, and if that were a deciding factor in Dulles'
decision, Dulles' role with respect to this entire question deserves a
bit more respect. It seems apparent that in this situation, in that
Egypt had an intense negative reaction to the West and to foreigners in
general, Dulles may well have been correct in his evaluation. With
respect to the lesson one might draw from this evaluation, perhaps the
specific one for Egyptian-American relations is that, particularly
considering Egypt's political history and culture, Robert Frost's dictum
about neighborly relations should he followed.
In a more general vein, a tentative conclusion from my readings of
the situation that existed in Egypt up to 1 956 is that nothing can > ,
knowledge of the culture and history of a country, its rellglon(s),
politics, and leaders, for usefulness in predicting its probal L< coi c
112. Reasoning that Duller, provided in his press conference on 2 A
1957 as reported by Love, op. c 1 1. . , n. J?6.

of future actions' and explaining or understanding its past actions. One
of the principal implications this may hold is that nations which inhibit
the free and open reporting and investigating of information (as did
Nasser, particularly during the revolt years of 1952-5^) are ^acting
contrary to the interests of world peace, for they ,are in effect attempt-
ing to prevent an accurate assessment of their dreams and fears, a.
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